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Katyn and its prelude
Stalin’s Polish policy
On 3 December 1941, Władysław Sikorski, the Prime Minister of the Polish go-
vernment-in-exile, Władysław Anders Polish general and Stanisław Kot, the Polish 
ambassador in Moscow visited Stalin. The theme for the discussion was the ways 
to set up a Polish army that would be made up of the Polish prisoners of war kept in 
the territory of the Soviet Union. Sikorski presented a list of 4000 names to Stalin 
and asked about the whereabouts of the persons on the list. The conversation that 
followed was something like:
Sikorski: These people must be here [in the Soviet Union] because none of 
them has returned.
Stalin: That’s impossible. They must have escaped.
Anders: Where could they have gone?
Stalin: Well, perhaps to Manchuria.
When the Polish visitors pointed out that it was an impossible explanation Stalin 
came up with the following theory:
“In that case, we must have let them free, but they have not reached home 
yet.”
Anders returned to talk about the Polish prisoners of war again on 18 March 1942 
and stated that “the officers that were kept at Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov” 
have not returned. Stalin responded calmly:

























“I have given my orders to let them free. They say that they are in Franz Josef 
Land, but there is nobody there. I do not know where they are. Why would 
we hold them back? Perhaps they are in lagers in the German-occupied ter-
ritory. They ran away.”
Stalin’s cynicism had no limits. He knew that the prisoners they were talking about 
were executed following Lavrentiy Beria’s initiative and Stalin’s approval in the 
spring of 1940 and they were in mass graves.
On 13 April 1943, it came to light. German troops invading the Soviet Union exca-
vated the first mass graves. On that day Radio Berlin reported that soldiers „found a 
28-m-long and 16-m-wide hole with 3000 Polish officers in it, arranged in 12 layers. 
They were dressed in army uniforms and some of them were tied up. Everyone had 
a gunshot wound in the back of their skulls.” The mass grave is in the Katyn Forest. 
It is likely that the prisoners kept at Kozelsk and transported to Smolensk were 
killed there. Two days later the world would learn the view of Stalin on the events: 
“The German fascist executioners did not hesitate to spread the meanest and most 
uninhibited lies and cover up the crime that – as it is obvious by now – they have 
committed.” Indeed, the Wehrmacht committed countless crimes in Soviet territory, 
but the massacre at Katyn is not among these. Yet, the lie that Stalin pronounced 
was a dogma in the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries until 1990. Even the 
Western European public was misinformed.
The first deportations
According to the treaty of Riga signed on 18 March 1921, the border between Po-
land and the Soviet Union east of the Curzon-line, but this still meant that about 1 
million ethnic Poles remained in the Soviet Union (the Soviet census of 1937 put 
this figure at 636 220). In the first half of the 1920s, the Kreml made a couple of 
apparently significant concessions to the nationalities of the empire. A number of 
autonomous areas were created. This is how the Polish District came into being 
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in 1925. It was named after Julian Marchlewski, the Polish communist revolutio-
nary who died in that same year. Its centre, Dovbysh, also adopted Marchlewski’s 
name.) Another Polish National District was created in the territory of the Bel-
arussian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1932. It was named after Felix Edmundovich 
Dzerzhinsky (A Bolshevik revolutionary of Polish origin who had a pivotal role 
in setting up the Soviet political police, the Cheka. Its centre, Koydanava, was re-
named Dzyarzhynsk and has kept this name ever since. However, the purpose of 
the Soviet leadership was to educate local propaganda personnel, spread the idea 
of communism among Poles and carry out collectivization. Yet, this plan failed to 
materialize because the Polish population resisted attempts of indoctrination and 
collectivization and also protested against the confiscation of their lands.
The Soviet leadership responded quickly. In the spring of 1935, they began the 
deportation of the Polish inhabitants of District Marchlewski to the mining zone 
of Ukraine and then to Kazakhstan. After the systemic change, it came to light that 
several Russian archives, such as that of the former KGB, the State Archives of the 
Russian Federation, Russian State Archives of Contemporary History and Russian 
State Archive of Socio-Political History, contain documents related to the deporta-
tion of Poles and other nationalities. These also showed that collectivization had an 
ethnic component. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the 
Main Administration of Camps (GULAG) accurately registered the nationality of 
so-called kulaks that were said to be anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary. It was pri-
marily Germans and Polish that were forced to leave their homes near the Western 
area of the Soviet Union.
According to the documents of the NKVD, between 1 and 9 February 1935 nearly 
two thousand families were deported from the Marchlewski District, out of which 
681 families were labelled Polish „Kulak and anti-Soviet”. In the next stage, bet-
ween 20 February and 15 March, 8329 Polish families (cc. 38892 persons) Soviets 
deported from their homes. As far as researchers could calculate, 21041 „Kulak” 
families were deported during the first four months of 1935. This means that Polish 
families constituted nearly 50% of the deported families in those four months. A 
note sent to Stalin and dated 31 July 1935 said the following: „In the Kiev territory 

























the Marchlewski District, which is said to be ethnically Polish, is the most anti-So-
viet zone and it is full of anti-revolutionary elements” including former members of 
the Polish army and nationalists that had been de-kulakized (meaning farmers that 
have been stripped of their land)”. However, leadership was not completely satisfi-
ed with deportations. On 27 October, Genrikh Yagoda – who was the leader of the 
NKVD by then – reported to Molotov that „we managed to clean the borderland of 
anti-revolutionary nationalist and anti-Soviet elements”, but on 5 March 1936 the 
same Yagoda ordered the deportation of 15 000 families to Kazakhstan, The ope-
ration took place in two stages. Until June 5535 and between June and September 
another 9465 families, a total of 69283 persons were deported to Kazakh lands.
The Marchlewski District was abolished in August 1935. Its centre was first re-bap-
tized Schorsk and later regained its old name of Dovbysh.  As we shall see below, 
Polish inhabitants of the Dzerzhinsky District did not fare better.
The “Polish Operation” of the NKVD (1937–1938)
Deportation of Polish peasants resisting collectivization was only the first one of 
a series of violent measures against the Polish inhabitants of the Soviet Union. 
“Polish Operation” of the NKVD is a subchapter of the Great Terror (1935–1940). 
A report prepared for Khruschev summarized the terror during Stalin’s era on 9 
February 1956. According to this document, between 1935 and 1940 1 980 635 per-
sons were convicted for anti-Soviet activities, and 688 503 of these were killed. For 
the period of 1937-38 there were 1 548 366 convictions and 681 692 executions. 
During the “Polish Operation” that lasted from 20 August 1937 until 1 august 1938 
(until 1 September in Belarus) 139 835 ethnically Polish people were convicted and 
111 091 of them were shot dead. Thus, while 44% of all convicted persons were 
killed during the terror, in the case of Polish people this ratio was 77.25%. Also, 
16% of all people executed in 1937-38 were Polish.
The anti-Polish operation began with order no. 00485  that Nikolai Yezhov issued 
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on 11 August 1937. This document did not mention Polish as a target group, but 
the 30-pages-long confidential letter attached to it revealed the real objectives. The 
letter established six categories for those that were seen as spies or anti-Soviet Poles 
that NKVD personnel had to capture and execute. (This „secret letter” is located 
at: RGANI, F. 6. Op. 13. T. 6. L. 8–51. N.V. Petrov – A.B. Roginski discuss it in 
detail).
The letter classified the entire Polish population as anti-Soviet.
1. It stated that former members of the Polish Military Organization (POW), 
which operated during World War I in the area under Russian occupation, 
were the most dangerous for the Soviet Union as they have infiltrated eve-
rywhere. Allegedly, they might be found in the Polish Communist Party, in 
the Polish section of the Comintern and even in the NKVD and Red Army. 
As a result of this view, nearly the entire membership of the Polish Com-
munist Party was killed, and the party dissolved. However, in reality, the 
former POW had no influence by that time and the network of intelligence 
that NKVD painted was mere fantasy.
2. Prisoners of war captured during the Polish-Bolshevik war constituted the 
second category. Their number was approximately 1500-3000. Later on, 
the terror reached those that spent too much time as prisoners of war in 
Poland.
3. The third sub-group within the targeted population were those that escaped 
to the Soviet Union that were emigrants that opted for Soviet communism. 
According to Yezhov, these could number several hundred thousand.
4. The fourth category was that of political emigres and the so-called exchan-
ged people. These were those that the two countries exchanged between 
1923 and 1932 – it mostly meant the exchange of political prisoners kept in 
Poland for Catholic priests and prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union. 
Their count was 425.
5. The fifth group partially overlapped with the fourth one. Those former Po-

























lish socialist and members of other parties were grouped here that ended 
up in the Soviet Union in some way or their home fell on that side after the 
borders were drawn in 1921
6. Finally, there were whose inhabitants of Polish districts (practically only 
the Dzerzhinsky District by that time) that were labelled anti-Soviet and 
nationalist. It could be applied to anyone.
In the autumn of 1937, Yezhov further expanded the scope of the operation to 
family members of the people that had been arrested by then. Women were mostly 
sentenced to 5-7 years of imprisonment or sent to one of the camps for a similar 
time period and children below 15 years of age were taken to orphanages.
Order no. 00485 was a model for the „struggle” against other nationalities. Yet, 
based on the number of those that were killed Polish ranked first as enemies.  As we 
have shown in another post, Stalin planned the annihilation of Poland ever since the 
treaty of Riga. He found German partners for this plan both during the Weimar era 
and after 1933. This culminated in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed 23 August 
1939, however, it did not end violent actions against Polish people.
Attack against Poland and new deportations 
After Germany had launched its campaign against Poland on 1 September 1939, it 
asked the Soviet Union to take control of the zone that belonged to them according 
to the secret clause of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. On 5 September Molotov told 
via the Germans via their ambassador that the Soviet Union needed some time. He 
posited that excessive eagerness would harm the cause of the Soviets. Also, he as-
ked the Germans not to cross the designated boundary in case they reach it before 
the Red Army. On 10 September, Molotov told Ambassador Schulenburg that the 
Soviet Union would cross the border under the pretext of defending Belarusians and 
Ukrainians living in Poland. Finally, on 16 September, he said that the following 
day would be the time to start the invasion. On 17 September 1939, the soviet go-
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vernment presented the Polish ambassador to Moscow with a memorandum that 
stated that the “the Polish state and its government actually ceased to exist.” […] 
The Soviet government cannot be indifferent to the situation that Ukrainian and 
Belorussian that are ethnically related to people of the Soviet Union and that live in 
Poland have become helpless and subject to an uncertain fate.”
The next day TASS released a communication with similar content. The argument 
was cynical as usual: Stalin gave the defence of Ukrainians and Belorussia’s as 
reasons while he ordered the deportation and murder of several tens of thousands of 
Ukrainians and Belarusians in the previous years. On 31 October, Molotov summa-
rized the success of Soviet policy in the following terms: „A rapid punch from the 
German army and then another from the Red Army was enough to raze Poland that 
was founded on the persecution of national minorities and was a monster of the tre-
aty of Versailles. The entire world is aware that there is no way to resurrect the old 
Poland.” The occupied territories were annexed to the Soviet Republic of Belarus 
and Ukraine (Wilno/Vilnius was attached to Lithuania then it was Sovietized) and 
the inhabitants were declared Soviet citizens. Thus, Stalin did not create a security 
zone or puffer area. He simply enlarged the area of the Soviet Union.
The Polish army did not launch a counterattack. The commander-in-chief called on 
the army to avoid engagement whenever possible. This is what probably happened 
since G. Kulik deputy commissioner for defence reported the following to the So-
viet political leaders on 21 September: „The Polish army, apart from some clashes 
with border guards, settlers and retreating units, did not fire at us. We have captured 
large numbers of privates and officers. […]  We cannot feed them.”
The Soviet Union did not ratify the Geneva Convention of 1929 about the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Thus, it did not see humane treatment obligatory. It was the 
so-called Directorate of Prisoners of Wars that dealt with them and it was under the 
NKVD. Lavrentiy Beria approved of the rules regulating the working of the direc-
torate but it did not say anything about provisions. On 3 October order no. 001177 
regulated the release and classification of prisoners. This talked about the release of 
Ukrainian, Belarus and Czech prisoners and had much to say about the Polish ones, 
too. This order designated camps to the classes and separated officers from privates.

























Although the Soviet institutions were struggling with providing food to Polish pri-
soners, they embarked on large-scale deportations from the newly occupied territo-
ry. They continued the policy that had been in place since 1935 against Poles living 
in the Soviet Union. The area of the territories occupied on 17 September was about 
200 000 km2 and the number of inhabitants was 11.5 million. The two largest ethnic 
groups were Ukrainians (4.4 million) and Poles (4.14 million). Mass deportations 
took place in four stages. Molotov, the chair of the Committee of Commissioners 
gave the orders and Beria worked out the details for each stage.
1. According to the decision taken on 29 December 1939, the first one was to 
take place in February 1940. This impacted 140 000 people 70 % of which 
were Poles.
2. The second wave began in April. This time it involved the deportation of 
61 000 people. 80% of the transports comprised of women as this order was 
about family members, refugees and prostitutes.
3. After this, in May-July 1940, during the third wave of deportations approxi-
mately 80 000 people were deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. 
They were mostly Jews.
4. The last wave of mass deportations took place in May–June 1941, thus, im-
mediately before the German invasion. Some historians believe that Stalin 
believed it was necessary to deport these 85 000 people in order to vacate 
the frontier zone in anticipation of the attack.
According to Western and Polish historians, the archival documents produced by 
the NKVD are incomplete, thus the figure of 320 000 must be a very conservative 
estimate. Roger Moorhouse and Norman Davies believe that the number of depor-
ted people well exceeded 1-1.5 million. Historians of the Polish Institute of Natio-
nal Remembrance estimate that the Soviets deported between 700 000 and 1 million 
Polish citizens in four stages.
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Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin, Kiev, Minsk
In the Kreml, the issue of prisoners of war also awaited resolution. The Soviet 
leadership had to motives for annihilating the Polish prisoners of war. On the one 
hand, the Soviets had difficulties providing food to them. On the other hand, they 
did not consider Poland to be an actor in future, thus, the Soviets thought of them 
as quasi stateless soldiers from a non-existing state. Soviet leaders did not believe 
they could integrate the prisoners to the ordinary life of the Soviet Union. Beria’s 
proposal dated 5 March 1940 attests this latter point:
”At present, a large number of former officers of the Polish army, Polish police and 
intelligence, unveiled members of Polish nationalist parties, refugees and others are 
kept in camps of the NKVD in Ukraine and in the western part of Belarus. All of 
them are enemies of the Soviet power and filled with hatred for the Soviet system. 
Officers and police officers attempt to engage in anti-revolutionary activities and 
anti-Soviet agitation even at the camps. They await their release only to take part in 
the fight against Soviet power.”
Beria asked for permission to execute them and he received it. The first point of the 
decision of the Politburo said that:
„Order for the NKVD of the Soviet Union: Investigate the cases of 1. The 14700 
former army officers, bureaucrat, landowner, police officer, intelligence agent, gen-
darme, settler, prison guard, prosecutor; 2. and 11 000 persons arrested and held 
in the prisons of Western Ukraine and Belarus a members of various counter-re-
volutionary and intelligence organizations, former landowners, factory owners, 
bureaucrats and deserters in an extraordinary manner and apply the most severe 
punishment that is execution by shooting.”
Stalin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kalinin and Kaganovich signed the proposal, thus they 
approved of it. The mass murder was committed between 3 April and 16 May 1940 
at several sites. 4 410 prisoners were brought to the Katyn Forest near Smolensk 
from three camps (Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov), 3739 prisoners were taken 
to the Piatykhatky homestead near Kharkov, and 6 314 were taken to Mednoye near 

























Kalinin (Tver). They were shot in the back of their head. Apart from the Polish 
victims, NKVD personnel killed 4181 Ukrainian in Kiev and 4465 Belarussian pri-
soners were murdered in Minsk.
On 22 June 1941, when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, the British insisted 
that Stalin should establish diplomatic relations with the Polish émigré government, 
and he eventually agreed. This was officially realized with the Sikorski–Mayski 
agreement signed on 30 July 1941. After this date, the Polish government and mi-
litary leadership made efforts to recruit an army made up of Polish prisoners living 
in the Soviet Union. That was when they started looking or the missing, murdered, 
prisoners of war. Eventually, it was the Anders army that was formed of those that 
were still alive. They were evacuated to Palestine via Iran in 1942. Subsequently, 
Polish soldiers took place in operations of the anti-Hitler coalition. Among other 
deeds, they were the ones that liberated Monte Cassino in Italy. 
In 1943, when the Germans discovered the mass graves, the Sikorski government 
turned to the Red Cross asking for a proper investigation of the graves. In response, 
Stalin broke diplomatic relations with the Polish government.
Aftermarth
At Stalin’s order, the deportations and the murder had to be kept secret. Nikita 
Khruschev’s so-called „secret speech” that he gave on 25 February 1956, on the 
last day of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was an 
exception. However, Khruschev did not give details about the ethnic background of 
victims and he did not say anything about Katyn. It was only on 13 April 1990 that 
the Soviet news agency, TASS, published an official press release saying that „On 
the basis of archival documents, we shall conclude that Beria, Myerlukov and their 
associates are directly responsible for the crimes committed in the Katyn Forest.” 
This communication did not say much, but this confession was gratifying for Polish 
society as Poles have always believed that it was the Soviets that committed the 
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murder. On the same day, at the meeting of Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mihail Gorba-
chev, the latter handed over hundreds of pages of documents to his Polish peer. The 
following day, Jaruzelski paid respect to the memory of victims at Katyn Forest. 
In October 1992, Boris Yeltsin handed over more documents to Lech Wałęsa, the 
President of Poland. This package included the infamous decision of 5 March 1940. 
These were published in four Polish and one Russian language volume. This meant 
a new beginning for memory politics.
The Poles asked the Russians to excavate all mass graves and to erect a monument 
above these. Graves at Katyn and Kharkov opened in 2000 to visitors. In 2002, 
after Vladimir Putin had visited Poland, a „Committee of Polish-Russian Difficult 
Cases” that consisted of historians, archivists and diplomats and had its first session 
in 2005. However, the process abruptly ended when Lech Kaczyńskit was elected 
president. The Kaczyński brothers were not open to Polish-Russian reconciliation 
and there were other political and economic issues that prevented rapprochement. 
The Polish government started insisting that Russia should recognize the murders 
at Katyn Forest as crimes against humanity. However, Russia is not willing to do 
so. In 2005, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation closed the case 
without inculpation. The prosecutors did not disclose the material collected during 
the investigation and did not allow Poland to consult the material.  Yet, Polish and 
Russian historians continued their work. There is plenty of literature on the Polish 
side while in Russia V.S. Iazhborovskaia, I.S Iablokov and A. Iu. Parsadanova pro-
duced a collective monograph that is an excellent synthesis that uses all accessible 
archival material from both Russia and Poland.
The Committee of Polish-Russian Difficult Cases restarted its operation in 2007 
when the Civic Platform won the election in Poland. This gained momentum fol-
lowing a meeting between the two ministers of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikors-
ki and Sergey Lavrov. In 2010, the committee summarized its findings in a large, 
900-page-long volume entitled „White spots, black spots. difficult cases in Russi-
an-Polish relations”. It discussed 16 problematic events in a way that a Polish and 
a Russian historian wrote a study about each issue, thus, the book consists of 32 
studies.

























In Poland, 13 April is the memorial day of the victims of the massacre at Katyn 
Forest. This time we also remember all the Polish victims of Stalin’s terror.
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